Recent Changes of Husband\u27s Rights in Wife\u27s Estate in Wisconsin by Fowle, Frederick H.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 28
Issue 1 Winter 1944 Article 7
Recent Changes of Husband's Rights in Wife's
Estate in Wisconsin
Frederick H. Fowle
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Frederick H. Fowle, Recent Changes of Husband's Rights in Wife's Estate in Wisconsin, 28 Marq. L. Rev. 36 (1944).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol28/iss1/7
THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
RECENT CHANGES OF HUSBAND'S RIGHTS IN WIFE'S
ESTATE IN WISCONSIN
By Chapter 316, sec. 1 and 4, respectively, of the laws of 1943,
effective June 16, 1943, section 233.23 of the Wisconsin Statutes'
entitled "Estates by the Courtesy," was amended to enlarge the interest
of a surviving husband in the estate of his wife to the extent of giving
him title in fee to one-third of the lands of which his wife died seised
and which were not disposed of by will; provided that the wife leaves
no surviving issue of a previous marriage; and section 318.01(1),
entitled "Distribution of personalty," was amended so as to create an
interest for a surviving husband in the intestate personal property of
his wife. This interest is equal to that of a surviving child and is not
less than one third where more than one child survives.
2
Until recently, one of the outstanding features in the picture of
marital property rights has been the willingness of the legislatures to
curtail the husband's protected interest in the wife's property, and yet
to retain a similar interest for the wife-an interest that, in most juris-
dictions, is greater than her common law dower. This discrimination
was most extensive at the time when dower and curtesy were first
undergoing statutory changes. The modern tendency is to treat hus-
band and wife alike.
Historically, the primitive notion of curtesy was a continuation of
the wife's inheritance given to the husband for the benefit of the issue
of the.marriage 3 while dower, until the time of Glanville, was an out-
right gift of lands or chattels from the husband to the wife.4
At common law, the husband had two distinct types of rights in his
wife's property: his marital rights by virtue of the marriage alone, and
his rights as tenant by the curtesy.
1233.23 of the statutes is amended to read as follows: "The husband on the
death of his wife shall * * * be entitled to one-third of the lands of which
she died seised and which were not disposed of by her last will and testa-
ment * * * , provided, that if the wife, at her death, shall leave issue by
any former husband, to whom the estate might descend, such issue shall take
the same discharged from the right of the surviving husband to * * *
the same * * * ." SESSION LAWS of 1943, Chapter 316, Section 1.2318.01(1) of the statutes is amended to read as follows: "The residue, if any,
of the personal estate of any intestate and the residue of the personal estate
of a testator not disposed of by will and not required for the purposes men-
tioned in section 313.15, shall be distributed in the same proportions, and to
the same persons, and for the same purposes, as prescribed for the descent
and disposition of real estate in Chapter 237, except that when the deceased
shall leave a widow or widower a lawful issue, the widow or widower shall
be entitled to receive the same share of such residue as a child of such
deceased, when there is only one child, and in all other cases one third of
such residue." SEsSoN LAWS of 1943, Chapter 316, Section 4.
32 Pollock and Maitland, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2nd Ed.) p. 414.
4 Digby, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (5th Ed.) p. 129. After Glan-
vill, dower property passed to the wife for life and then reverted to the hus-
band's heirs or ddevisees or his successors in title. See PARK, DowER, Sec. 341.
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By virtue of the marriage a husband was entitled, absolutely, to
all of his wife's personal property then in her possession, and all of
her choses in action which he reduced to possession during the cover-
ture. Choses in action not reduced to possession in her lifetime belonged
to him as her administrator if as such he took them into possession.;
All the wife's chattels real became the husband's to use and enjoy for
the period of their married life and to dispose of and hold their pro-
ceeds if he alienated them during coverture. They were liable for his
debts but he could not will them away.6 The interest of the husband
in his wife's real property was initially an estate during coverture
which might last for his life. Upon marriage the husband was entitled
to the possession and enjoyment of all his wife's real property. Hus-
band and wife were considered jointly seised of the property in the
wife's right, but the husband had the sole rights to the rents, issues,
profits and control. Although his marital rights were so extensive that
lands could be aliened by him or could be levied upon for his debts, the
husband's interest was nevertheless limited to a present estate that
existed only during coverture and that terminated upon the death of
the wife-the property descending to the wife's heirs of whom the
husband was not one.
Beside the right to a present estate during coverture a husband
might, under the common law, become a tenant by the curtesy. Curtesy
was defined as being a life interest of a husband in all the real property
of which his wife was beneficially seised of an estate of inheritance
during coverture, provided a child be naturally born of the marriage,
born alive and capable of inheriting property.7 After the birth of issue
and while the wife was still living, the husband had curtesy initiate
in the real property of which his wife was seised. Curtesy initiate was
a freehold estate for his life in the realty ;8 an interest which gave him
the power to convey, which could be reached by judgment and sold
on execution against him, for which he could sue alone in his own
right if it was wrongfully injured or taken from him, etc. On the
death of the wife leaving the husband surviving, curtesy became con-
sumate by operation of law. He thus acquired an interest that was to
continue during his own life which he held as he would any other life
estate, being subject to the same incidents, rights, and duties as those
that belonged to life estates in generalY Accordingly, he could sell it,
encumber it, or lose it for his debts, but he did not lose it because of a
subsequent marriage.
5 2 KENT'S COMMENTARIES pp. 130-143.
62 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES p. 434.
7REEVES ON REAL PROPERTY p. 636.
8 2 BLACKSTONE': COMMENTARIES p. 128.
9 Cruise, REAL PROPERTY tit. 5 Ch. ii, Sec. 26.
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Before the statute of uses there was no curtesy in a use or other
equitable estate."0 But after that statute, whereby law sought to destroy
uses, had been emasculated, chiefly through the decision in Tyrrel's
Case, and uses had been retained under the guise of passive trusts,
the courts of Chancery applying to uses the maximum "Equity fol-
lows the law" allowed curtesy in them and ultimately in all the forms
of equitable estates.' 1 Thereafter a husband had curtesy in a fee of
any kind that his wife owned during coverture, whether legal or
equitable in nature.
At an early date the fact that this great control over the disposition
of his wife's property often resulted .in great injustice was recognized
by the court of equity; consequently, when a husband was seeking in
that tribunal to perfect his possession and use of his wife's property,
the requirement that there be an adequate settlement made out of it
for the support of her and her children was laid down. This was de-
signated her "equity in settlement"' 2 and was later extended so that
even though the husband was not seeking a remedy, the wife, when
circumstances so required, could affirmatively apply to the court of
equity and have settled on her a fair share of the property for the
support of herself and her children. 13 Not only did the court of equity
work out this important advantage of settlement for the wife, but also,
in several other instances, bestowed property rights on her such as the
law would not recognize. 14 The principles underlying these equitable
interests of a wife were fully recognized in this country; however,
their importance lies not in their ensuing application but rather in the
fact that these inventions of the court of equity laid the foundation for
that wave of legiilation, beginning about 1844, which carried forward
until the wife was completely liberated from the harsch dogmas of the
common law.
Much legislation has affected the legal life estate enjoyed by the
husband under the common law. Academically, it may be said that, in
the beginning, common law curtesy was recognized in Wisconsin; 15
however, this recognition, if it did exist, was short lived. In 1849 the
legislature, by statute, gave the husband what was labeled as "Estates
10 Digby, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (5th Ed.) p. 32.
11 REEVES ON REAL PROPERTY Sec. 450.
12 2 KENT'S COMMENTARIES p. 139.
13 Elibank v. Montolieu, 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 486.
14 The method early came into use in England and was fostered by the Court
of Chancery of making settlements in trust "for the sole and separate use"
of married women. See Parker v. Brooke, 9 Ves. 583; 2 PERRY ON TRUSTS,
Sections 646-649.
15 Wis. Const., Art. XIV, Sec. 13.
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by the Courtesy" 11 but which by contrast to that estate under the
common law, did not warrant the use of the term. Although the
statute on its face appeared to give the husband the same right of cur-
tesy as was known under the common law, contingent, however, upon
the non-existence of issue by a previous marriage of the wife, the
passage of the Married Women's Act in 185017 and subsequent judicial
construction' limited the statutory right of curtesy to a life estate in
intestate lands of the wife.' 9 This life estate was not contingent upon
the birth of issue20 and came into existence only after the death of the
wife.21 Beside the wife's ability to defeat curtesy by conveyance or
testamentary disposition, the husband's rights could be defeated by his
wife's grantors -2 indeed, the statutory right of curtesy resembled its
common law predecessor in name only. The 1849 legislature also pro-
vided a statutory method for the distribution of personalty.2 ' This
method, which has been in effect until the 1943 amendment, did not
give a surviving husband an interest in the intestate personal property
of his wife.
The revolution for the liberation of women reached its culmina-
tion in the 1921 Wisconsin Equal Rights Statute24 which granted to
women all privileges and rights enjoyed by men. It is notable that in
the same session but not in accordance with the "Equal Rights" phi-
losophy, a husband's estate by the courtesy, meagre as it then was,
was further reduced by limiting it to an estate during widowerhood.2 5
The inequity that exists relative to the property rights of husband
and wife is increased by the fact that in the same situation, one rule
of law will apply if a wife is involved while another will apply if the
16 R. S. 1849, Chapter 62, Sec. 30. Estates by the Curtesy: "When any man and
his wife shall be seised in her right of any estate of inheritance in lands, the
husband shall, on the death of his wife, hold the lands for his life, as tenant
thereof by the curtesy; provided, that if the wife, at her death, shall have
issue by any former husband, to whom the estate might descend, such issue
shall take the same, discharged from the right of the surviving husband
to hold the same as tenant by the curtesy."
127 R. S. 1858, Chapter 95.
Westcott and Husband v. Miller 42 Wis. 454, (1877).
18 Kingsley, Adm'r, etc. v. Smith, 14 Wis. 360, (1861).
19 R. S. Chapter 89, Sec. 30 was amended in 1878. Words at the beginning not
now descriptive of the manner in which the wife's lands were held were
omitted and the clause 'and which were not disposed of by her last will and
testament" . . . was added thereby making the statute, on its face, reflect
the prior judicial construction.
20 Kingsley Adm'r. etc. v. Smith, 14 Wis. 360, (1861).
21 Schmidt v. Raymond 148 Wis. 271, 134 N.W. 362, (1912).
2 Haight v. Hall 74 Wis. 152, 42 N.W. 109, (1889).
23 R. S. 1849, Chapter 68, Sec. 1 (6).
24 P_ S. 6.015. See also 246.01, 246.03, 246.05, 246.07.
25 R. S. 1921 Chapter 98 Sec. 2180.
" . . . provided further, that in case of any husband whose wife dies after
August 31, 1921, then any right of curtesy he nay have attained shall be
extinguished upon his remarriage."
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husband is concerned. For example, a transfer of property without
consideration by a wife to her husband is presumed to create a trust =o
a like transfer from a husband to his wife is presumed to be a gift.2 7
At the death of the transferor then, the property of a surviving wife
can be restored to her with comparative dispatch, but the property of
the surviving husband, though not intended as a gift, often is not re-
turned to his possession. This leads to a common situation, namely
where a man is unwitttingly deprived of his property by the death of
his wife intestate because he has placed his property in her name, not
for the purpose of losing dominion over it but for his own convenience
or her protection. Here failure to overcome the presumption that the
transfer was a gift is fatal to the husband's rights.
If the husband is the sole heir, except for the burden of taxes, he
will not suffer irreparable injury since he will regain his property by
descent or distribution. But such is not the case if there are surviving
issue of the marriage or if the wife leaves surviving issue of a previous
marriage. As against his own children, the husband has enforceable
rights under sections 233.23 and 318.01(1) whereby he could recoup
one third of his property; but as against surviving issue of a wife's
previous marriage, the husband is without legal remedy. Should issue
of two marriages survive, the husband could recover one third of that
portion of his wife's estate that descended to the children of his mar-
riage, on the basis of the rule laid down in Kingsley, Adm'r. etc. v.
Smith. 18
The 1943 amendments make it appear that the legislature is aware
of the inequity that exists relative to the property rights of husband
and wife; nevertheless the amendments have not solved the problem.
While the amendment to sec 318.01(1) has created a valuable and
definite interest, the amendment to the curtesy statute has merely
given a husband a one-third interest in fee in place of an estate during
his widowerhood in the intestate lands of his wife. This is still sub-
ject to the contingency that the wife leaves no surviving issue of a
previous marriage. Only individual cases as they arise in the future
will show whether a husband has been benefited or injured by this
change since a life interest in an entire estate might devolve greater
advantages upon the holder than ownership of one third in fee. Irre-
spective of what the result may be, Wisconsin continues in need of
legislation that will equalize the property right of husband and wife.
It is to be noted that a substantial majority of the jurisdictions in
this country have already given the husband a vested interest in the
26Estate of Brundage, 185 Wis. 558, 201, N.W. 820 (1925); Harter, Ex'r. v.
Holman, 152 Wis. 463, 139 N.W. 1128 (1913).
27 30 CoRPus JuRis 702, Husband and wife, sec. 298.
28 14 Wis. 360 (1861).
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estate of the wife. Thirty-one jurisdictions have given the surviving
husband an estate of the curtesy or some substitute which the wife
may not defeat by her will29 and eight jurisdictions, known as com-
munity property states, have established systems of survivors' rights.30
Wisconsin stands among the few remaining jurisdictions wherein
reform is imperative.
There is little uniformity in legislation or in opinions regarding
what portion of the wife's estate should go to the surviving husband;
however, since, in Wisconsin, a wife already enjoys a statutory dower
right, it would be reasonable to institute a complimentary system
whereby a husband would have the absolute right to a similar portion
of his wife's property.
There would seem to be no adequate reason why the protected
rights of husband and wife in each others property should not be the
same.
FREDERIcK H. FOWLE.
29 Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, West. Virginia,
and Wyoming. See VERNIER, AmERICAN FAmY LAWS Sec. 216.3 0 Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Wash-
ington. See VERNIER, Am EIcAN FAmILy LAWS Sec. 178.
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